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PARALLEL IMPORTATION OF TRADEMARKED
GOODS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Kaoru Takamatsu*
The rapid development of international trade has raised a serious prob-
lem in trademark law. The importation of genuine goods by someone
other than the designated exclusive importer is usually referred to as
"parallel importation." For example, when a manufacturer wants to sell
his branded products in a foreign country, he often appoints an exclusive
distributor in that foreign country and sells the products through that dis-
tributor. The manufacturer, who owns identical trademark rights in his
home country and in the foreign nation, either grants a license or assigns
his trademark to the distributor. The problem of parallel importation
arises when a third party purchases the trademarked products in the manu-
facturer's home country and imports them into that foreign country with-
out the distributor's consent.' Whether this importation constitutes in-
* Attorney at Law, Associate, Adachi, Henderson, Miyatake & Fujita, Tokyo, Japan; currently
on leave of absence and working with Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Los Angeles, Califor-
nia; LL.B., 1976, Kyoto University; LL.M., 1981, University of Washington.
The author wishes to thank Professor Donald S. Chisum of the University of Washington School of
Law who read the manuscript and provided helpful comments. The author also expresses his grati-
tude to Gordon F. Hampton, who supported publication of this article, and to Jo Amanda Covey, who
proofread an early draft.
1. Identical problems arise when patented or copyrighted goods are imported by a third party
under the situation of parallel patents or parallel copyrights. See generally Ladas, Exclusive Territo-
rial Licenses Under Parallel Patents, 3 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 335 (1972) (dis-
cussing parallel patent problems) [hereinafter cited as IIC]; Schatz, The Exhaustion of Patent Rights
in the Common Market, 2 IIC, supra, at 1 (1971) (same); Kuwata, Krgyrshoyaken no zokuchisei to
sono taikeiteki ichizuke (Territoriality of Industrial Property and its Position), 12-2 HiKA-
KUHOZASSHI (COMPARATIVE LAW MAGAZINE) I (1979).
Because of the difference in functions and purposes between a trademark and a patent, the solu-
tions to the problems of parallel importation of trademarked goods do not necessarily resolve prob-
lems arising from parallel patents.
For case law on parallel patents in the United States, see Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890)
(recognizing infringement of patent rights when third party imported patented products); Griffin v.
Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (same). For case law in Japan,
see Brunswick Corp. v. Orion K6gy6 K.K., 460 Jurist 141 (Osaka District Ct., June 9, 1969) (recog-
nizing infringement of the patent right by the third party, and emphasizing the principle of indepen-
dence of patent rights). The Court of Justice of the European Economic Community has allowed
importation of patented goods by a third party when parallel patents were involved. Centrafarm, B.V.
v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8466. See also
Parke Davis & Co. v. Probel, 1968 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 55, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8054.
On the problem arising out of parallel copyrights, see generally Reimer, Copyright Law and the
Free Movement of Goods, 12 IIC, supra, at 493 (1981). On copyrights and parallel importation in
Australia, see Cornish and McGonigal, Copyright and Anti-trust Aspects of Parallel Imports Under
Australian Law, 11 IIC, supra, at 731 (1980).
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fringement of the trademark right in the importing country has long been
disputed. Fact patterns vary depending on the relation between domestic
and foreign trademark owners. The problem becomes more complex if
the products sold by a distributor are different in quality from those im-
ported by a third party. Parallel importation has been discussed in terms
of the functions of a trademark and in terms of major principles of trade-
mark law such as territoriality and exhaustion. Antitrust considerations
also emerge because of the public interest in free trade.
This Article reviews how major countries and common markets, in-
cluding the United States, Japan and the European Community, have
dealt with the problem of parallel importation. It then suggests common
criteria to solve this problem in each nation. It concludes that the proper
results in parallel importation cases will be reached if the problem is ana-
lyzed in terms of the major functions of trademarks.
I. APPROACH OF MAJOR COUNTRIES AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
A. United States
Initially, American courts refused to protect trademark holders from
parallel importation. 2 In Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer,3 a Hungarian manu-
facturer assigned the sole distributorship right along with the trademark
fight on "Hunyadi Janos," a type of mineral water. The defendant pur-
chased genuine Hunyadi Janos water in Germany and imported it into the
United States. Unable to maintain its own higher price, the plaintiff ap-
plied for an injunction. The court found no infringement of the plaintiff's
trademark fight because the defendant imported and sold genuine goods. 4
Section 11 of the Tariff Act of 1897 provided that no article which
"copied or simulated" registered trademarks shall be admitted entry to
2. See generally Vandenburgh, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods Is Not a
Trademark Problem, 49 TRADE-MARK REP. 707 (1959) (discussing history of parallel importation):
Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise-The Role of the United States Bureau
of Customs. 59 TRADE-MARK REP. 301 (1969) (same); Kuhn, Remedies Available at Customs for
Infringement of a Registered Trademark, 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 387 (1980) (discussing customs
remedies for parallel importation).
3. 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
4. Id. at 20. The defendant was aware that the plaintiff was the exclusive distributor in the United
States. The manufacturer had refused to sell Hunyadi Janos water to the defendant for the purpose of
importing it into the United States. In addition, the labels affixed by the manufacturer to the bottles of
Hunyadi Janos water said "'this bottle is not intended for export." However, the court held that the
conduct of the defendant did not constitute unfair competition because the defendant was selling
genuine goods and there was no confusion about the identity of the products nor any misrepresenta-
tion. Id. The court did recognize the possibility of intentional interference with the plaintiff's contract
relation if the defendant had conspired with the manufacturer. Id. at 20-21.
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the United States, 5 but this provision was interpreted to apply only to
counterfeited articles. 6 Section 27 of the Trademark Act of 19057 also
prohibited importation of goods bearing marks which "copy or simulate"
the United States registered marks, but this provision was also held inap-
plicable if genuine goods were imported by those other than the trade-
mark owner in the United States. 8
The early view in the United States, then, was that the purchaser of an
exclusive sales right, together with a trademark right, could not prevent a
competitor from importing and selling identical merchandise bearing the
same trademark so long as the competitor had legitimately acquired the
trademarked merchandise abroad. This view was soon to change.
In A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,9 a French cosmetic manufacturer
which had established itself in the United States and acquired trademark
rights sold its business in the United States to the plaintiff. It also sold its
U.S. trademark rights in "Java." The defendant purchased genuine
cosmetic products bearing the trademark "Java" and sold them in the
United States. The trial court held that the defendant had no right to sell
within the territory where the plaintiff was the exclusive owner of the
trademark, and had infringed the plaintiff's trademark right. 10 This deci-
sion was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which
followed the early rule applied in Apollinaris. 11
Before the case was decided by the Supreme Court, Congress hurriedly
enacted section 526 of the Tariff Act. 12 Section 526, without using the
5. Ch. 11, § 11,30 Stat. 151,208 (1897) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(1976 & Supp. IV
1980)).
6. 24 Op. Att'y Gen. 551 (1902).
7. Ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 730 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1976)).
8. Hunyadi Janos Corp. v. Stoeger, 285 F. 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1922); Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v.
Schoening, 238 F. 780, 782 (2d Cir. 1916). In Gretsch, the American trademark owner was an
exclusive distributor of the German products. The third party purchased genuine products in Ger-
many. When he attempted to import them into the United States they were detained by a collector of
the Port of New York. The court, referring to Apollinaris, held it was not infringement of trademark
rights to sell genuine goods identified by the trademark because the public was not misled but was
getting exactly what it paid for. Id. at 781.
9. 260 U.S. 689(1923).
10. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 274 F. 856, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). The trial court emphasized
that the American trademark owner had to pay a substantial amount of money for the purchase of the
transferred business and for advertising the trademarked goods. Id. at 859.
11. A. Boujois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539,540-42 (2d Cir. 1921). While acknowledging that
an American patentee may prevent importation of patented goods under a parallel patents situation,
the Court of Appeals distinguished trademark rights from patent rights in that a trademark does not
give the owner a monopoly but just indicates the origin of the goods. Id. at 543. See Boesch v. Graff,
133 U.S. 697 (1890).
12. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 975 (1922) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1526
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). The purpose of this speedy legislation was to overcome the Second Circuit
decision in Katzel. Atwood, supra note 2, at 304; Note, Importation Control under TariffAct Section
526: Trademark Privileges andAntitrust Policy, 67 YALE L.J. 1110, 1111 n. I (1958).
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term "copying" or "simulating," makes it "unlawful to import into the
United States" any merchandise which "bears a trademark owned by a
citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within,
the United States." 1 3 This legislation was designed to rectify the unsatis-
factory protection of domestic assignees against parallel importation by
competitors. 14 Shortly after the enactment of section 526, the Supreme
Court, without applying that statute, reversed the Court of Appeals' deci-
sion in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel. 15 The Court recognized that the pub-
lic understood the trademarked goods as coming from the plaintiff. It held
that the importation of genuine goods by the defendant should be ex-
cluded in view of the plaintiff's trademark right. 16
The Supreme Court decision in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel and the
enactment of section 526 of the Tariff Act gave an independent United
States assignee of a trademark protection against parallel importation. 17
The statutory provision was later held to be so broad that it prevented the
importation of genuine merchandise even for personal use. 18
The Supreme Court's decision in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel is gener-
ally recognized as having overruled prior case law allowing parallel im-
portation. 19 This is questionable, however, because the Supreme Court
emphasized that the public understood that the trademarked goods came
from the domestic trademark owner rather than from the foreign manufac-
turer. 20 The early cases can be distinguished as dealing with situations in
which the public considered foreign manufacturers to be the origin of the
trademarked goods.
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
14. See 62 CONG. REC. 11,603-64 (1922) (debate on § 526).
15. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
16. Id. at 692. Justice Holmes drew an analogy between a patent and a trademark in terms of
their monopolistic protection. Id. However, it should be noted that the purpose of the trademark
protection does not lie in the maintenance of owners' monopolistic power in the market.
17. In A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (mem.), the Supreme Court indi-
cated that parallel importation of genuine goods constituted infringement of a domestically registered
trademark within the meaning of section 27 of the Trademark Act of 1905. In 1947, the Lanham Act
created a new federal trademark statute. Pub. L. No. 489, 60 Stat. 427 (1947) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Section 42 of the Lanham Act, however, merely reenacted § 27
of the Trademark Act of 1905. Ch. 540, 542, 60 Stat. 440 (1947) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1124
(1976)). The precedential value of A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge is therefore undiminished.
18. Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir. 1931), affd on rehearing. 48
F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1931). In 1978, § 526 was amended to allow importation of trademarked goods
for personal use. Act of October 3, 1978, tit. II, § 21(a)(2), 92 Stat. 903 (1978) (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1526(d)(Supp. IV 1980)).
19. Atwood, supra note 2, at 305; Note, Trade-Mark Infringement: The Power of an American
Trade-Mark Owner to Prevent the Importation of the Authentic Product Manufactured by a Foreign
Company, 64 YALE L.J. 557, 558 n. 11 (1955).
20. 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923).
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A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel answered many questions, but at least four
issues remained unsettled: (i) whether an antitrust violation occurs when
territorial protection of trademark rights is used for worldwide market di-
visions; (ii) whether parallel importation may be prohibited if the foreign
and domestic trademark owners have a parent-subsidiary relation; (iii)
whether a licensee, rather than an assignee, of a trademark may exclude
parallel importation; and (iv) whether section 526 of the Tariff Act, which
protects only Americans and American corporations, is contrary to the
principle of national treatment found in the Paris Convention. 21 These
issues are discussed below.
1. Parallel Importation and Antitrust
The first two questions arose in United States v. Guerlain, Inc.22 In
Guerlain, the defendants, who were closely associated with a French
manufacturer, were assigned certain trademark rights and were importing
trademarked goods. Each defendant, in accordance with section 526 of
the Tariff Act, filed certificates with the Bureau of Customs registering
their trademarks for the purpose of preventing parallel importation. The
Department of Justice brought civil actions against the defendants, charg-
ing a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 23 The district court held
that section 526 of the Tariff Act operated only to the advantage of an
independent American trademark owner and that it did not enable the
American part of an international enterprise to prevent parallel importa-
tion of genuine goods. 24 The court found that the defendants had violated
the Sherman Act.25
The effect of Guerlain on later legislation is important, despite the
eventual dismissal of the antitrust charges. 26 In 1972, new Customs Reg-
ulations were adopted that interpret and supplement section 526 of the
Tariff Act. 27 Under these regulations, parallel importation may not be
21. Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1629, T.I.A.S. No. 6923.
22. 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated and remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958). On re-
mand, the district court granted the government's motion to dismiss. 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
23. The Sherman Act made it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." Ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat.
209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976)).
24. 155 F. Supp. at 80.
25. 155 F. Supp. at 87-88. The court emphasized that the trademarks registered by the defen-
dants in the United States did not indicate defendants as the true source of the goods but rather indi-
cated that the goods came from France. Thus, the court stated parallel importation would not deceive
the public about the authenticity or origin of the goods. 155 F. Supp. at 81-82.
26. See note 22 supra.
27. 37 Fed. Reg. 20,678 (1972) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 133 (1981)).
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prohibited if the foreign and the United States trademark owners are the
same entity, or are in a parent-subsidiary relation, or are subject to com-
mon ownership or control. 28 Thus, in a fact pattern like Guerlain, a do-
mestic trademark owner can no longer depend on the protection of section
526 of the Tariff Act.
2. Parallel Importation and Licensees
A licensee who is not an owner of the trademark in the United States is
not entitled to protection under section 526 of the Tariff Act. 29 Some
courts have indicated that an American distributor, although not the
owner of a trademark in the United States, may be protected from parallel
importation based on prohibitions against unfair competition or unlawful
interference with contract relations. 30 Parallel importation itself, how-
ever, should not constitute unfair competition unless such importation of
genuine goods confuses or deceives the public. 31
3. Parallel Importation and the Paris Convention
The Paris Convention, of which the United States is a member, pro-
vides that legal protections of industrial property are to be applied without
regard to nationality among the member nations. 32 In light of this princi-
28. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1981). "Common ownership" is defined as meaning "individual or
aggregate ownership of more than 50 percent of the business entity." Id. § 133.2(d)(1). "Common
control" is "effective control in policy and operations and is not necessarily synonymous with com-
mon ownership." Id. § 133.2(d)(2).
29. Owners of trademarks "registered in the Patent and Trademark Office" may file such trade-
marks with the Secretary of the Treasury to obtain section 526 protection. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)
(Supp. IV 1980).
30. See, e.g.. Perry v. American Hecolite Denture Corp., 78 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1935), in which
an American distributor processed imported products to improve their quality. Thus, the products
sold by the American distributor were different in quality from those sold by the parallel importer.
This difference justified prohibition of parallel importation because otherwise the public would be
confused and deceived about quality. Id. at 560-61. In DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 622 F.2d
621 (2d Cir. 1980), the court suggested that an exclusive distributor who has no trademark right may
have a cause of action against a parallel importer based on the theory of intentional interference with
contract relations. Id. at 624. Cf. Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 20-21 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886)
(holding that third party has no obligation to refrain from importing genuine goods even though aware
of the existence of exclusive distributorship agreement; parallel importation by itself should not con-
stitute interference with distributor's contract relations).
31. See Majestic International Corp. v. Lumal Sales Co., 178 F. Supp. 906, 910 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (holding that third party may import trademarked products if the American distributor does not
own the trademark fight in the United States.).
32. Article 2 of the Paris Convention provides:
(I) Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of industrial prop-
erty, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their respective laws now
grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice to the rights specially provided
438
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ple, section 44(h) of the Lanham Act provides that the same remedies are
available to both American and foreign registrants. 33 However, section
526 of the Tariff Act protects only those trademarks owned by a citizen or
by a corporation or association organized within the United States. 34 For-
eigners who own American trademarks cannot avail themselves of section
526 of the Tariff Act. 35 Even though the Tariff Act provides only admin-
istrative remedies to American trademark owners, section 526 substan-
tially violates the principle of national treatment under the Paris Conven-
tion.36
4. Summary
Parallel importation of genuine goods may be excluded only when an
American distributor owns the trademark right in the distributor's own
name and is independent from the foreign trademark owner. Recent regu-
lations have limited the impact of section 526 of the Tariff Act, but a
basic question still remains. Section 526 was originally enacted to protect
the American purchaser of a business from fraud by the foreign assig-
for by this Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the latter, and the
same legal remedy against any infringement of their rights, provided that the conditions and
formalities imposed upon nationals are complied with.
(2) However, no requirement as to domicile or establishment in the country where protection
is claimed may be imposed upon nationals of countries of the Union for the enjoyment of any
industrial property rights.
(3) The provisions of the laws of each of the countries of the Union relating to judicial and
administrative procedure and to jurisdiction, and to the designation of an address for service or
the appointment of an agent, which may be required by the laws on industrial property are ex-
pressly reserved.
Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583,
1631, T.I.A.S. No. 6923. See generally 2 S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS
§§ 564-587 (1975).
33. 15U.S.C. § 1126(h) (1976). See also id. § 1126(b).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
35. The Supreme Court in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, in excluding parallel importation, did
not rely on section 526 of the Tariff Act. 260 U.S. 689 (1923). So, theoretically speaking, foreigners
may ask a court to enjoin parallel importation under section 42 of the Lanham Act and may achieve
the same effect as under section 526 of the Tariff Act. See note 17 supra (discussion of the Lanham
Act). However, this is more costly and time consuming than the administrative remedy of exclusion
under the Tariff Act.
36. The Customs Bureau's justification for this distinction is based on A. Bourjois & Co. v.
Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), and on the legislative history of section 526 of the Tariff Act, both of
which emphasized the protection of property rights of American citizens who have purchased trade-
marks from foreign firms. Atwood, supra note 2, at 305-06. This is not persuasive. Suppose a Ger-
man manufacturer sold its business in the United States together with its trademark right to a Japanese
company, which then registered the trademark in the Patent and Trademark Office in its own name.
The Japanese company could not prevent parallel importation by a third party because it is not a
corporation organized within the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
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nor. 37 Defrauded purchasers have remedies under the law of contracts,
however. Section 526 has operated to stop parallel importation by a third
party who has nothing to do with the possible fraud. Unless the public is
confused or deceived about the origin or quality of the trademarked
goods, parallel importation should be allowed. In this respect, section
526 should be modified. 38
B. Japan
The Trademark Law of Japan was completely revised in 1959. 39 Under
the Trademark Law, "importing a thing on which the registered trade-
mark or a trademark similar thereto is indicated" constitutes infringement
upon the trademark right or exclusive use right. 40 An exclusive use right
is one registered with the Patent Office as an exclusive license and
receives the same protection as a trademark right. 41
The Customs Duties Act of Japan42 prohibits the importation of goods
that would infringe a domestic patent, utility model, industrial design,
trademark, or copyright. The owner of a trademark or an exclusive use
fight may demand that the Customs Bureau exclude imported goods
which infringe the owner's trademark right. 43 However, neither the
Trademark Law nor the Customs Duties Act expressly prohibits parallel
importation of genuine goods.
Initially, the Japanese courts took a strong stance against parallel im-
portation. In Nestle Nihon K.K. v. Sankai Shdten,44 a Swiss manufacturer
owned the trademark "Nescafe," and its Japanese subsidiary was regis-
tered as an exclusive use right owner of the trademark. The Japanese sub-
sidiary imported Nescafe coffee from its parent company. A third party
also imported genuine Nescafe coffee. The court held that the third
party's possession of the coffee infringed the exclusive use fight of the
Japanese subsidiary and affirmed the temporary injunction preventing the
37. See 62 Cong. Rec. 11,603 (1922) (debate on § 526).
38. The Supreme Court in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel excluded parallel importation based on
the American owner's trademark right. 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923). This holding should be limited to
cases in which the trademark indicates the American distributor as the origin of the goods. These
cases will be very rare.
39. ShShy6 h6 Law No. 127 of 1959.
40. Id., art. 37(5).
41. Id. Thus, an exclusive licensee of a trademark who is registered as the exclusive use right
owner may demand an injunction and claim damages against infringement of the registered trade-
mark. See id., art. 36 and 38.
42. KanzeiTeiritsu hW. Law No. 54 of 1901.
43. Id., art. 21(1)4.
44. Nestle Nihon K.K. v. Sankai Sh6ten (unreported case, Tokyo Dist. Ct., May 29. 1965).
summarized in T. Dot. DIGEST OF JAPANESE COURT DECISIONS IN TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPUeI-
TION CASES 66 (1971) [hereinafter cited as DIGEST].
440
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third party from selling Nescafe coffee in Japan. 45 The Tokyo District
Court in Nestle seems to have assumed that any unauthorized importation
of genuine goods infringes domestic trademark rights.
The series of Parker Pen cases are the most significant statement of
Japanese parallel importation law. Schulyro Trading Company was an ex-
clusive distributor of Parker pens in Japan, and it registered an exclusive
use right on the "Parker" trademark in Japan. When a third party im-
ported Parker pens from Hong Kong, Schulyro obtained the equivalent of
a temporary injunction from the Tokyo District Court.46 Schulyro then
filed with the Customs Office an application to prevent importation of
goods that infringed the trademark "Parker." When another party tried to
import pens from Hong Kong, the Customs Office refused to issue an
import permit without Schulyro's consent. The third party responded by
bringing an action against Schulyro in Osaka District Court, seeking a
declaration that Schulyro had no right to bar importation of genuine Par-
ker pens.
The decision of the Osaka District Court47 was comprehensive and has
been influential. The court first acknowledged that Schulyro did not man-
ufacture the Parker goods, but only imported them, and found that the
goods imported by others were exactly the same in quality as those Schu-
lyro imported. The court rejected the principle of territoriality of trade-
mark rights as being irrelevant to the problem of parallel importation. 48
Instead, it examined the function of trademark protection. The court rec-
ognized that the purpose of trademark law is to protect marks as indica-
tions of source and as a guarantee of quality. 49 While refusing to adopt
45. The court found that the third party's possession of the coffee was not for personal use. Id.,
summarized in DIGEST, supra note 44, at 67. It did not mention whether importation of genuine goods
solely for the personal use of the importer also constitutes infringement. One commentator has sup-
ported the court's decision because it based the difference of quality between the Nescafe imported by
the third party and that sold by the subsidiary. T. Doi, KOGYOSHOYOKEN CHOSAKUKEN To KOKUSAI-
TORIHIKI (INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS) 323 (1967). The
court, however, did not refer to the difference in quality.
46. Schulyro Trading Co. v. K.K. Aki Sh6kai (unreported case, Tokyo Dist. Ct., June 1, 1964),
summarized in DIGEST, supra note 44, at 68. The court granted the injunction without giving a reason
for doing so. 1d. at 70.
47. N. MC. Co. v. Schulyro Trading Co., Feb. 27, 1970, Osaka Dist. Ct., 234 Hanrei Taimuzu
(Law Times Reports) 57, reprinted in English in 16 JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113
(1972) [hereinafter cited as JAIL].
48. Id., reprinted in JAIL, supra note 47, at 120. See notes 98-102 and accompanying text infra
(discussion of territoriality principle).
49. The court emphasized the public aspect of trademark protection:
[The direct object of protecting trademarks is to ensure the functions of trade-marks and
thereby, it is also aimed at the ultimate protection of public interest as well as the trademark
owner's interest. In this regard, the trademark protects rights which have a very strong social
and public nature in comparison with other intangible property. In a system which applies the
registration principle, even ignoring the fact that the trademark fundamentally has the nature of
Washington Law Review
the exhaustion theory50 of trademark rights, the court applied the criminal
law theory of "illegal in substance" (jisshitsuteki-ih5sei no riron) to the
problem of parallel importation. 5'
The court considered several factors in deciding whether the parallel
importation was illegal in substance: (i) the internationally well-known
trademark "Parker" indicated the manufacturer, and not the domestic
distributor, as the origin of the goods; (ii) the other Parker pens were
equal in quality to those sold by Schulyro; (iii) Schulyro's goodwill as the
exclusive distributor was based on the reputation of Parker goods in the
world market; (iv) parallel importation of genuine goods by third parties
may well promote fair and free competition in price and servicing of the
products; and (v) the parallel importer did not take advantage of Schu-
lyro's advertisements of Parker goods. In addition, the parallel importer
did not employ unfair practices. 52
The court held that there was nothing illegal in substance in the case,
and rendered the judgment that Schulyro had no right to exclude importa-
tion and sale of pens bearing the genuine Parker trademark. 53 Though this
case was dismissed on appeal for other reasons, 54 the High Court, in
dicta, affirmed the holding of the District Court. 55
The Parker case brought substantial legislative change. In 1972 the
private property, it is evident that the scope of its protection is naturally subject to social restric-
tions and the proper scope of the lex locus principle of the trademark must be reasonably decided
after consideration of whether or not the functions of the trademark are infringed in the light of
the spirit of the protection of trademarks.
234 Hanrei Taimuzu 57 (1970), reprinted in English in JAIL, supra note 47, at 129.
50. See notes 132-137 and accompanying text infra (discussion of exhaustion theory).
51. The court explained this point as follows:
However, we think that for a party to be entitled to enjoin a third party's act on the basis that it
infringes his trademark he must prove not only that such act was done by a person having no
right to do so but also that in substance, it was an unlawful act. In case the same person has
registered an internationally well-known trademark both domestically and abroad, in determin-
ing whether a third partys' [sic] importation of goods bearing such registered trademark will
constitute not only superficially but also substantially an unlawful act, we think that it is not
inconsistent with the principle of the independence of trademarks to take into consideration such
facts as that the trademark is well-known all over the world, that the said goods were produced
in a foreign country by a rightful person, were sold after affixing the relevant trademark, and so
forth.
234 Hanrei Taimuzu 57 (1970), reprinted in English in JAIL, supra note 47, at 130.
52. Id., reprinted in English in JAIL, supra note 47, at 131-32.
53. Id., reprinted in English in JAIL, supra note 47, at 134.
54. N. MC. K.K. v. Schulyro Trading Co., Osaka High Ct., Aug. 6, 1971, 267 Hanrei Taimuzu
(Law Times Reports) 242. While this case was pending on appeal to the High Court, Parker Co.
terminated the exclusive distributorship agreement with Schulyro and the registration for the exclu-
sive use right on the trademark "Parker" was cancelled. At the same time, the application to exclude
importation filed with the Customs Office was withdrawn. The High Court, therefore, vacated the
judgment and dismissed the case because Schulyro no longer held the exclusive use right. Id. at 242.
55. ld. at 243.
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Customs Division of the Ministry of Finance of Japan issued a new notice
under the Customs Duties Act. 56 This notice provided that parallel impor-
tation by third parties may not be excluded at the Customs Office where
the domestic trademark owner also holds the foreign trademark and is
supplying the goods to the parallel importer, or where the domestic and
foreign trademark owners should be considered the same entity by virtue
of their special relationship. 57 Parker dealt with parallel importation
where both the domestic and the foreign trademarks were owned by the
same person. Under the new notice, parallel importation is allowed not
only in a case like Parker, but also where the foreign and domestic trade-
marks are owned by parent-subsidiary companies. The notice also makes
clear that parallel importation of genuine goods for an importer's personal
use will not be treated as infringement of trademark rights. 58
In 1972, the Fair Trade Commission of Japan, which administers the
Japanese Antimonopoly Act, published guidelines for sole import distri-
butorship agreements. 59 The guidelines stipulate that it is an unfair busi-
ness practice to unduly hinder parallel importation of goods covered by a
distributorship agreement. 60 Thus, parallel importation of genuine goods
cannot be enjoined by a Japanese sole distributor as a matter of the anti-
trust law.
The Supreme Court of Japan has not yet addressed the problems inher-
ent in parallel importation. The lower courts, however, have accepted the
Parker decision. 61 The District Court decision in Parker apparently
solved the problem of parallel importation in Japan.
56. The Procedures for Application of Import Prohibitions of Goods Infringing Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Finance Ref. No. 1443 of 1972.
57. Id. 15. The same paragraph indicates that parallel importation may be enjoined if the parallel
imported goods are different in quality from those sold by the authorized distributor.
58. Id. 4.
59. Antimonopoly Act Guidelines for Sole Import Distributorship Agreements, Fair Trade Com-
mission of Japan (Nov. 21, 1972).
60. Id. at 1(4).
61. In K.K. Asahi v. Asahi Tsfish6 K.K., Aug. 31, 1973, Tokyo Dist. Ct., 301 Hanrei Taimuzu
(Law Times Reports) 268, the court recognized that the issue of lawful parallel importation arises
where (i) the foreign trademark owner has an identical trademark in Japan and grants an exclusive use
right, or (ii) the domestic trademark owner has a close relation with the foreign trademark owner,
either legally, as in a sole distributor arrangement or economically, as in a parent-subsidiary relation.
In Heiwad6 K.K. v. K.K. KinseidS, May 31, 1978, Tokyo Dist. Ct., 368 Hanrei Taimuzu (Law
Times Reports) 351, the court distinguished Parker and found an infringement of the trademark right
by the parallel importer. The domestic trademark owner had acquired the trademark right on "Tech-
nos" before it entered into a relationship with the foreign trademark owner. However, the licensee of
the domestic trademark owner used the mark "Technos" on goods it assembled from parts imported
from the foreign trademark owner. The court should have determined whether the public recognized
that the trademark "Technos" indicated the domestic trademark owner as the origin of the goods and
whether the imported goods were different in quality from those assembled by the domestic owner's
licensee. See II A] (discussion of the origin and quality functions of a trademark).
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C. European Countries
Switzerland is the first country in Europe that faced the problem of
parallel importation. Because it has made no statutory provision that reg-
ulates parallel importation of genuine goods, the problem has been dealt
with by case law. Most of the case law has arisen from the activities of
multinational corporations. Initially, the courts took a strict position and
enjoined parallel importation of goods manufactured by a member of an
international group to which the Swiss trademark owner also belonged. 62
This conclusion followed from a finding that the public did not regard the
trademark as indicating the group itself.63 A few years later, in a criminal
case, the court rendered a judgment in favor of a parallel importer. 64
In Philips A. G. v. Radio Import GmbH,65 the court for the first time
acknowledged the legitimacy of parallel importation in a civil case. The
court in Philips emphasized that the trademark "Philips," used in Swit-
zerland, had come to identify the products of the Philips organization.
The court found no risk that the public misunderstood the origin of the
goods, and concluded that the domestic trademark owner could not enjoin
parallel importation of Philips products made by the German subsidiary
of the Philips organization. 66
Recently the Swiss Federal Supreme Court had another chance to con-
sider the problem of parallel importation. In Sunlight A.G. v. Bosshard
Partners Intertrading A.G. (Sunlight II),67 the court enjoined the parallel
importation on the ground that the public attributed the trademarked
goods to the specific Swiss subsidiary of a multinational corporation. The
trademark meant more to the public than mere identification of the multi-
national. 68
62. E.g., Judgment of Feb. 12, 1952, Fed. Sup. Ct. (Switz.), 78 Entscheidungen des Schweizer-
ischen Bundesgerichts, Amtliche Sammlung [BG] 11 164, 78 Arrts du Tribunal ffd~ral Suisse. Re-
cueil officiel [ATF 11 172 [Sunlight I], reprinted in English in L. EBB, REGULATION AND PROTECTION
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 482 (1964). Note that in this case all of the trademarked products sold by
the domestic trademark owner were made in Switzerland and that the quality of goods made by the
domestic owner may have been different from those manufactured by the foreign company.
63. Id., reprinted in English in L. EBB, supra note 62, at 486.
64. Judgment of Oct. 17, 1958, Fed. Sup. Ct. (Switz.), 84 BG IV 119, 84 ATF IV 119, re-
printed in part in English in L. EBB. supra note 62, at 490.
65. Judgment of Oct. 4, 1960, Fed. Sup. Ct. (Switz.), 86 BG IV 119, 86 ATF II 270, summar-
ized in 52 TRADE-MARK REP. 152 (1962), and in S. LADAS, supra note 32, § 738, at 1350.
66. Id. While the conclusion of Philips is contrary to that of former case law, Philips is consis-
tent with the basic holding of Sunlight . The conclusion of both cases depended on whether the
public understood that the trademark indicated the domestic trademark owner as the origin of the
goods. Compare S. LADAS, supra note 32, § 738, at 1350 (synopsis of Philips) with L. EBB. supra
note 62, at 486-87 (translation of Sunlight I; discussion of public perception).
67. Judgment of Jan. 25, 1979, Fed. Sup. Ct. (Switz.), reprinted in English in II IIC, supra
note 1, at 245.
68. Id., reprinted in English in II IIC, supra note 1, at 250-51.
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In West Germany, as in other civil law countries, the problem of paral-
lel importation has been entrusted to the courts. The first case that came
before the German Federal Supreme Court was Maja.69 In that case, a
Spanish manufacturer owned the trademark "Maja" in both Spain and
Germany. The manufacturer appointed a sole distributor of its goods in
,Germany and granted it an exclusive license. When a third party imported
Maja goods from Spain, the German sole distributor sued the parallel im-
porter. The Federal Supreme Court, affirming the judgment in favor of
the parallel importer, held that the owner's control over the trademarked
goods ends when he puts the goods on the market whether or not this
happens in Germany or Spain.70 This decision is unique in that the hold-
ing is based on the "exhaustion" theory of trademark rights. 71 In Maja,
the foreign and domestic owners of the trademark were the same, a fact
which simplified the issue.
Cinzano & Co. GmbH v. Java Kaffeegeschidfte GmbH & Co. 72 is the
leading parallel importation case in Germany. In Cinzano, the German
trademark was owned by a German subsidiary of an Italian manufacturer.
The products were imported by a third party from Spain and France, and
differed in quality from those sold by the German subsidiary. In address-
ing the exhaustion theory, the court held that the distribution of trade-
marked goods in Spain and France could be judged under the domestic
trademark law as if the German trademark owner itself had marked those
goods and placed them on the market. 73 This was because the companies
in those countries derived their authority to mark the products from the
Italian manufacturer. As to the principle of territoriality, the court recog-
nized it as merely a rule of international conflict of laws which is not
useful in solving the problem- of parallel importation. 74 The court de-
clared that the only function of a trademark is to indicate the commercial
origin of goods, and held that the public in Germany understood the Ital-
ian manufacturing group to be the source designated by the trademark. It
concluded that the parallel importation by the third party did not consti-
69. Judgment of Jan. 22, 1964, Fed. Sup. Ct. (W. Ger.), 41 Bundesgerichtshot (BGHZ) 84,
summarized in English in 54 TRADE-MARK REP. 452 (1964).
70. Id., summarized in English in 54 TRADE-MARK REP. at 453 (1964).
71. See notes 132-137 and accompanying text infra (discussion of exhaustion theory).
72. Judgment of Feb. 2, 1973, Fed. Sup. Ct. (W. Ger.), reprinted in English in 4 IIC, supra note
1, at 432.
73. Id., reprinted in English in 4 IIC, supra note 1, at 435. The court stated that the exhaustion
theory of trademark rights is "merely a short figurative designation for the legal concept that it is
incompatible with the limited purpose of the trademark monopoly to impede on grounds of trademark
law the continued distribution of goods that have been marked and placed on the market with the
consent of the trademark owner." Id.
74. Id., reprinted in English in 4 IIC, supra note 1, at 436.
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tute an infringement of the domestic trademark rights. 75 The problem of
parallel importation under German law is said to have been completely
resolved.76
Austria was once thought to be one of the few countries where an ac-
tion against parallel importation was likely to succeed. 77 The decision in
Agfa-Gevaert GmbH v. Schark78 changed this attitude. In that case, the
plaintiff owned the trademark "Agfa" in Austria and was an exclusive
Austrian distributor of Agfa goods, which were manufactured by its Ger-
man parent company. The defendant imported Agfa goods directly from
Germany. The plaintiff brought an action for injunctive relief. The Su-
preme Court relied on the exhaustion theory of trademark rights to affirm
the judgment refusing the injunction. 79 The court did recognize that the
functions of a trademark are to designate the origin of goods and to guar-
antee the public's expectations of quality. 80
In the Netherlands, the Hoge Raad, the highest Dutch court, once held
that where German and Dutch trademarks were owned by the same com-
pany, the company could not, as an exercise of its Dutch trademark
rights, enjoin the distribution of genuine goods imported from Ger-
many. 81 More recently one lower court followed the conclusion of the
Hoge Raad and rendered a judgment in favor of the parallel importer. 82
The lower court held that the difference in quality would not prevent par-
allel importation because the composition of goods is a question of com-
pany policy which the parent company may exercise at will to influence
its subsidiaries. The composition may be lawfully modified even within
75. The court indicated that emphasizing the "guarantee function," i.e., using trademarks to
guarantee quality, would lead to isolation of the market by means of trademark laws. Id., reprinted in
English in 4 IIC, supra note 1, at 437. However, differentiation in quality due to local demands is
reasonable, and the public should also be protected from confusion about the quality of goods.
76. Beier, Comment, 4 11C, supra note 1, 440, at 441.
77. Beier, Comment, 2 11C, supra note 1, 225, at 225.
78. Judgment of Nov. 30, 1970, Sup. Ct. (Aus.), reprinted in English in 2 11C. supra note 1, at
220.
79. Id., reprinted in English in 2 11C, supra note I, at 223. See notes 132-137 and accompany-
ing text infra (discussion of exhaustion theory). The court emphasized the economic unity between
the parent and subsidiary in applying the exhaustion theory beyond the border of the nation. The court
also indicated that the "Agfa" trademark did not distinguish goods of the subsidiary from those of
the parent company but rather just distinguished the goods of the Agfa group of enterprises from
those of a different origin.
80. Judgment of Nov. 30, 1970, Sup. Ct. (Aus.), reprinted in English in 2 11C, supra note 1, at
223.
81. Judgment of Dec. 14, 1956, Hoge Raad dev. Nederlander (Neth.), 25 Bijblad Bij de Indus-
triele Eigendom [B.I.E.] 46, summarized in Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks
and Good Will, 47 Va. L. Rev. 733, 736-38 (1961).
82. Judgment of Apr. 1, 1969, Commercial Ct. (Neth.), reprinted in English in I IIC, supra note
1, at 149.
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the Netherlands under the same trademark. 83 In the Netherlands then,
parallel importation cannot be enjoined where the domestic and foreign
trademark owners are the same. 84
A liberal attitude toward parallel importation is also apparent in Bri-
tain85 and Sweden. 86
D. The European Community
In 1957 six European nations signed the treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community (the "Rome Treaty"). 87 The Rome Treaty
contains several competition provisions. 88 One of these provisions is Ar-
ticle 85, which prohibits "any agreements between enterprises" that are
likely to restrict competition within the common market. 89 The European
Court of Justice, created by the Rome Treaty, has rendered a series of
decisions treating parallel importation as a problem of free movement of
goods within the Common Market. 90 These decisions allow parallel im-
83. Id., reprinted in English in I IIC, supra note 1, at 150.
84. The Dutch court enjoined parallel importation when the domestic and foreign trademarks
were owned by different persons. Judgment of Nov. 14, 1963, Ct. App. of the Hague. The court
should have examined the legal and economic relations between the foreign and domestic trademark
owners.
The Benelux Uniform Law on Trade Marks is now effective in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands. Under this law, a single Benelux trademark right is granted within the territory of the
three countries. Article 13A of this Act provides that the Benelux trademark owner cannot enjoin
parallel importation of genuine goods which were put on the market by the owner or his licensee.
Benelux Convention on Trade Marks, 704 U.N.T.S. 342, 351-52. It is not clear from a literal read-
ing of this provision whether exhaustion of domestic trademark rights occurs if the trademarked
goods are distributed outside the Benelux countries. The answer is considered to be in the affirmative.
Waelbrock, Trademark Problems in the European Common Market, 54 TRADE-MARK REP. 333, 344
(1964); see also Racymaekers, Assignment, Licensees, and Abandonment of Trademarks in the Bene-
lux, 68 TRADE-MARK REP. 15 (1978).
85. See generally T. WHrrE, KERLY'S LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES 293 (1966)
(discussing registration of trademarks). A famous case allowing parallel importation in Britain is
Champagne Heidsieck v. Buxton, 47 Pat. Cas. 28 (1930). See also Revlon Inc. v. Cripps & Lee Ltd.
reprinted in I 1 IIC supra note 1, at 372 (1980 decision by High Court of Justice, Chancery Division
favoring parallel importation).
86. See generally Koritz, The Problem of Parallel Importation-A Comparative Study of Trade-
mark Law in the United States and Sweden, 9 N.Y.U.J. INT'L LAW & POL. 389 (1976) (discussing
Swedish approach to parallel importation).
87. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 3.
88. Article 30 generally prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports within the member States.
Id. at 26. Article 36 allows such import prohibitions or restrictions only if necessary to protect indus-
trial property. However, Article 36 stipulates that "such prohibitions or restrictions must not consti-
tute either a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member
States." Id. at 29.
89. Id. at 47-48.
90. See generally Kemp, The Erosion of Trademark Rights in Europe: Phase 11, 69 TRADE-
MARK RaP. 460 (1979) (discussing European Court of Justice decisions); Loewenheim, Trademarks
and European Community Law, 9 IIC, supra note 1, at 422 (same); Maday, The Hag and the Negram
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portation unless the domestic and foreign trademark owners are com-
pletely unrelated and their trademark rights arose independently of each
other.
The first case was Establissements Consten v. Commission of the Euro-
pean Economic Community.91 In that case, a German manufacturer ap-
pointed a French trading company as its sole French distributor and
granted registration of its trademark in the distributor's name in France. A
third party imported genuine goods from Germany. The distributor sued
the parallel importer for violating his trademark rights. The Court of Jus-
tice recognized that an agreement permitting the sole distributor to regis-
ter the trademark in his name, thus giving him the exclusive right to use
that trademark in that country, could be subject to the prohibition of Arti-
cle 85 of the Rome Treaty. The court, affirming the decision of the Com-
mission in favor of the parallel importer, held that the distributorship
agreement granting domestic trademark ownership for the purpose of di-
viding markets and restricting competition was illegal under Article 85.92
This conclusion parallels the development of case law on parallel impor-
tation in most European countries. The Court of Justice reached the same
conclusion from the viewpoint of free competition.
In Sirena S.r.1. v. Eda GmbH,93 the Court of Justice took another step
regarding parallel importation. In that case, a domestic trademark owner
had obtained the trademark from a foreign manufacturer, but did not have
any further contact with that manufacturer. A third party imported genu-
ine goods. Because the domestic trademark owner manufactured the
products independently, they must have differed in quality from those
made by the foreign manufacturer. The Court of Justice, however, ap-
plied Article 85 to the case and rendered a judgment for the parallel im-
porter. The court considered that a mere assignment of a trademark some
thirty years ago satisfied the requirement of "agreements between under-
takings" under Article 85.94 The court's analysis in Sirena was incom-
plete, however. The court should have determined how the public re-
Decisions of the European Court of Justice, 65 TRADE-MARK REP. 34 (1975) (same); Waelbrock, The
Effect of the Rome Treaty on the Exercise of National Industrial Property Rights. 21 ANTIrrTRUST
BULL. 99 (1978) (same).
91. 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299 [1961-66 Transfer Binder], COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8046.
92. Id., COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9 8046, at 7651-53. As to the trademark owner's allegation
relying on Article 36 of the Rome Treaty, the court stated: "Article 36 limits the application of the
provisions on the liberalization of trade contained in Title I, Chapter 2, of the Treaty, but it does not
limit the application of Article 85." Id., COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) T 8046, at 7654.
93. 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 69, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) T 8101.
94. Id., COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8101, at7lll-13. The mere assignment of a trademark in
the past with no continuing relation between the parties should not constitute an "agreement" prohi-
bited by Article 85. See Kemp, supra note 90, at 464; Waelbroeck, supra note 90, at 114.
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_garded the trademark. The court should have also considered that the
domestic trademark owner developed its own p-oducts, which must have
been different in quality from those imported by the third party.
The superiority of the Rome Treaty over national trademark laws was
again shown in Van Zuylen Frerer v. Hag AG. 95 In that case a German
firm owned the trademark "Hag" in Germany and in other European
countries, and assigned its trademark rights in Belgium and Luxembourg
to its Belgian subsidiary. At the end of World War II, the Belgian subsidi-
ary was sequestered as enemy property and the "Hag" trademark in Lux-
embourg was assigned to an independent Luxembourg company. In
1972, the German firm marketed its Hag coffee in Luxembourg. The in-
dependent Luxembourg company sued the German firm for infringement
of its domestic trademark right. The Court of Justice held that the inde-
pendent Luxembourg trademark owner could not enjoin the parallel im-
portation by the German firm. 96 In so holding, the court relied on Article
3697 of the Rome Treaty rather than on Article 85.98 If the court in Hag
95. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8230.
96. Id., COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8230, at 9125. In that case, the court should have inquired
into the difference in quality between those locally manufactured goods and those imported from the
German manufacturer. The court also appeared to underestimate the function of a national trademark
since it did not examine the extent to which the public recognized the origin of goods based upon the
trademark "Hag." See II AI (discussion of the functions of a trademark).
97. See note 88 supra (discussion of Article 36).
98. The fact situation in Hag was similar to that in Sirena in that the domestic trademark owners
in both cases had no legal or economic relation with the foreign owners at the time of parallel impor-
tation. However, the court in Hag abandoned the application of Article 85. The court held that be-
cause there was "no legal, financial, technical or economic link" between the two present holders,
Article 85 was not applicable. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8230,
at 9124. On the relation between the competition provisions of the Rome Treaty and the national
industrial property rights, the court in Hag stated:
As a result of the provisions in the Treaty relating to the free movement of goods and in
particular of Article 30, quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent
effect are prohibited between Member States.
Under Article 36, these provisions shall nevertheless not preclude prohibitions or restrictions
on imports justified on grounds of the protection of industrial or commercial property. Neverthe-
less, from this same article, in particular its second sentence as well as its context, it appears that
while the Treaty does not affect the existence of rights recognized by the legislation of a Member
State in matters of industrial and commercial property, the exercise of these rights may neverthe-
less, depending on the circumstances, be affected by the prohibitions in the Treaty.
Id., COMMON MKT. RP. (CCH) 8230, at 9124.
This existence/exercise distinction has been adopted in other cases. See, e.g., Centrafarm B.V. v.
Winthrop B.V., 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1183, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) V 8247. It seems,
however, that the existence of trademark rights without the exercise thereof has no significance. The
above holding is equivalent to saying that national industrial property rights are always subject to the
prohibitions of the Rome Treaty. As far as parallel importation is concerned, the problem can be
solved within the framework of national trademark laws. On the existence/exercise distinction, see
Schlag, A Theoretical Analysis of Knowhow Licensing Under EEC Competition Law: Territorial
Restrictions, 26 ANrITRusT BULL. 347, 355 (1981).
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intended to hold that an owner of a trademark in one country cannot en-
join the marketing of goods bearing an identical trademark that was law-
fully affixed in another country, it went too far.99 The function of a na-
tional trademark should always be taken into account in dealing with
parallel importation.
In Terrapin (Overseas) Limited v. Terranova Industrie C.A. 100 the
Court of Justice addressed the question of parallel importation where the
domestic and foreign trademarks have no common origin. A German
manufacturer owned the trademark on a certain product, and a third party
imported a similar product with a similar trademark which was lawfully
registered in Britain. The Court of Justice allowed the domestic trade-
mark owner to enjoin the importation of goods bearing the lawfully af-
fixed trademark. 101 Thus, parallel importation can be prevented within
the Common Market where there is no economic or legal relation between
the domestic and foreign trademark owners and where their respective
rights have arisen independently of each other.
Further development can be found in the recent decision of the Court of
Justice in Centrafarm B.V. v. American Home Products Corp. 102 In that
case, an American company owned two different trademarks in two na-
tions: "Seranid" in Britain and "Seresta" in Holland. It sold the same
products under these two trademarks through its local subsidiaries. A
third party puchased products in Britain with the trademark "Seranid"
and imported them into Holland after changing the trademark to
"Seresta." The Court of Justice allowed the American company to pre-
vent the importation by the third party.103 It noted, however, that such
99. The court stated:
To prohibit the marketing, in one Member State, of a product legally bearing a trademark in
another Member State for the sole reason that an identical trademark having the same origin,
exists in the first State, is incompatible with the provisions for the free movement of goods
within the Common Market.
1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 73 1, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8230, at 9125. The Hag decision has
been criticized. See, e.g., Loewenheim, supra note 90, at 426; Waelbroeck, supra note 90, at 118.
100. 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1039, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8362.
101. Id., COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8362, at 7606.
102. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1823, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8475.
103. Id., COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8475, at 8593. This case also concerns the problem of
repacking of trademarked products. In Hoffmann-LaRoche A.G. v. Centrafarm, 1978 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 1139, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8466, the Court of Justice held that where a proprietor
owns the same trademark in two nations, the proprietor may lawfully prevent a product to which the
trademark has been applied in one nation from being marketed in another nation after it has been
repacked and after the original trademark has been affixed to the new packaging by a third party.
However, the Court of Justice noted that this prevention of marketing constitutes a 'disguised restric-
tion of trade" within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 36 if the following conditions are
satisfied:
-It is established that the use of the trademark right by the proprietor, having regard to the
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prevention may constitute a "disguised restriction" on trade under Arti-
cle 36 if the owners of different trademarks adopted such a practice in
order to partition markets. 104
Apart from decisions by the Court of Justice, the unification of trade-
mark laws within the Common Market started as early as the 1960s. 105
Although the 1964 Preliminary Draft of a Convention for a European
Trademark has never developed into effective law, the Commission has
worked for regulations on trademark laws to promote competition and the
free movement of goods within the Common Market. The results of the
Commission's work were two proposals submitted to the Council of the
European Communities on November 12, 1980. One was entitled "Pro-
posal for a First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Mem-
ber States Relating to Trademarks" (the "Directive"). The other was en-
titled "Proposal for a Council Regulation on Community Trademarks"
(the "Regulation"). 106
The Directive is designed to harmonize and approximate the national
trademark laws within the Common Market, and the Regulation creates a
Community trademark which is valid over all areas of the Common Mar-
ket. 107 Both the Directive and the Regulation have provisions on exhaus-
tion of trademark rights. They both provide that a trademark owner is not
entitled to prohibit the use of the trademark for goods that have been put
on the market under that trademark by the proprietor or with the proprie-
tor's consent. 108 This exhaustion principle, together with several signifi-
marketing system which he has adopted, will contribute to the artificial partitioning of the mar-
kets between Member States;
-It is shown that the repackaging cannot adversely affect the original condition of the prod-
uct;
-The proprietor of the mark receives prior notice of the marketing of the repackaged prod-
uct; and-It is stated on the new packaging by whom the product has been repackaged.
Id., COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8466, at 840 1. Because of the generality and vagueness of the first
condition above, the position of the Court of Justice toward the problem of repacking is not so clear.
See generally Beier, The Doctrine of Exhaustion in EEC Trademark Law-Scope and Limits, 10 IIC
supra note 1, at 20 (discussing repackaging and parallel importation).
104. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1823, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 4 8475, at 8593. Because
Article 36, which the Court of Justice has adopted to deal with parallel importation, concerns the free
movement of goods within the Common Market, parallel importation from outside the Common Mar-
ket cannot be protected by Article 36. See EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS U.K. Ltd., 1976 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 811, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 18350.
105. See Beier, Objectives and Guiding Principles of the Future European Trademark Law, 8
IIC, supra note 1, at 1.
106. Both proposals can be found in COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) TV 5826, 5837. See generally
Schwartz, The Rationale of the Approximation Directive and the Regulation on Community Trade
Marks, 12 IIC, supra note 1, at 319 (discussing the proposals).
107. COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 44 5826, 5837. The Community trademark system would co-
exist with national trademark laws of member states. The Directive supplements the Regulation in
that the Directive removes, to some extent, restrictions imposed by the national trademark laws. Id.
108. Article 6 of the Directive and Article 11 of the Regulation, reprinted in id. Exhaustion of a
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cant exceptions,1 09 echoes the Court of Justice's basic idea on parallel
importation. Thus, the new proposals embrace the case law development
not only of the Court of Justice but also of tribunals of most European
countries. The new proposals recognize the lawfulness of parallel impor-
tation under most fact situations.
II. DISCUSSION
Parallel importation is sometimes defined simply as importation of
goods bearing a trademark legally affixed in a foreign country but not
authorized by a domestic owner of the identical trademark. There are a
large number of fact patterns in parallel importation cases, however. It
might be wise to classify these fact patterns into groups. While commen-
tators have suggested several classifications, 10 the following classifica-
tion is most convenient.
The first major category is cases in which the domestic and foreign
trademarks are owned by the same person. Within this category, two
types of cases are possible: (1) those where the owner opposes importa-
tion; and (2) those where the owner's domestic licensee opposes importa-
tion. Within each category, different cases may be presented depending
upon whether the imported goods are of the same quality as the domestic
goods.
The other major category is cases in which the domestic and foreign
trademarks are owned by different people. If the domestic and foreign
trademark holders are legally or economically related, the case may de-
pend on the quality of the imported goods. Other possibilities are pre-
sented if the domestic and foreign owners are unrelated, but the trade-
marks have a common origin. Finally, the domestic trademark owner
may have obtained the trademark independently of the foreign owner,
with whom it has no legal or economic relation.
Under the case law examined above, the legality of parallel importation
depends, to some extent, on the fact patterns. In general, if the trademark
European Community trademark occurs when the trademarked goods have been put into circulation
within or outside the Common Market. Schwartz, supra note 106. at 329 (1981).
109. The exceptions to the principle of exhaustion as set forth in the Directive are: '(a) where
there are legitimate grounds for opposing importation into the Community of goods put on the market
outside it: (b) where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the
market: (c) where the goods are repackaged by a third party." Article 6(2), reprinted in COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 5826. at 4725-4. While the second and third exceptions are reasonable in light of
case law, the first one is so general that interpretaton by courts is needed. The Regulation is equipped
with similar exceptions to the principle of exhaustion. Article 11 (2), reprinted in id. 5837. at 4731 -
7.
110. See, e.g., S. LADAS. supra note 32, at 1326, 1349: Beier. Territoriality of Trademark Law
and International Trade. I IIC, supra note 1, at 50.
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rights are held by one person or if the domestic and foreign owners are
related, the exercise of domestic trademark rights to block parallel impor-
tation is apt to be denied. "'1 On the other hand, if the domestic and for-
eign trademark owners have no relation and both trademarks are acquired
independently, a domestic trademark owner is more likely to succeed in
blocking parallel importation. "12
While fact patterns have some impact on courts' decisions regarding
parallel importation, the principles courts use to analyze parallel importa-
tion also affect the decisions. The principles or doctrines that have often
been used to solve the problem of parallel importation are examined be-
low.
A. Principles
1. Functions of a Trademark
Examination of the functions of a trademark helps to establish criteria
for solving the problem of parallel importation. Even the courts that relied
on the exhaustion theory examined the functions of a trademark. 13 Fur-
thermore, most courts deciding in favor of parallel importers reviewed the
purpose of trademark laws and the functions of trademarks.1 4 Courts and
commentators have formulated three possible functions of a trademark. 15
These functions are: (i) an origin function, (ii) a guarantee function, and
(iii) an advertising function.
The origin function of a trademark identifies the goods of a trademark
owner and distinguishes them from goods of others. This does not mean
that a trademark always indicates a particular manufacturer or distributor
of the trademarked goods, however. Rather, the origin function operates
so that the public can recognize that all goods with the same trademark
come from the same source or come through the same channel." 16
111. E.g., United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated and re-
manded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958); N. MC. Co. v. Schulyro Trading Co., Feb. 27, 1970, Osaka Dist.
Ct., 234 Hanrei Taimuzu (Law Times Reports) 57, reprinted in English in 16 JAIL, supra note 47, at
113.
112. E.g., Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v- Terranova Industrie C.A., 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1039, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8362.
113. E.g., Judgment of Nov. 30, 1970, Sup. Ct. (Aus.), reprinted in English in 2 IIC, supra
note 1, at 223 (Agfa-Gavaert GmbH v. Schark); Judgment of Jan. 22, 1964, Fed. Sup. Ct. (w. Ger.),
41 BGHZ 84, sunmarizedin English in 54 TRADE-MARK REP. 452 (1964) (Maja).
114. E.g., N. MC. Co. v. Schulyro Trading Co., Feb. 27, 1970, Osaka Dist. Ct., 234 Hanrei
Taimuzu (Law Times Reports) 57, reprinted in English in 16 JAIL, supra note 22, at 113; Judgment
of Feb. 2, 1973, Fed. Sup. Ct. (W. Ger.), reprinted in English in 4 lIC, supra note 1, at 439.
115. 1 1 McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COM'EnTrrxoN 85 (1973). See also Schechter,
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HALv. L. REv. 813 (1927).
116. Schechter, supra note 115, at 816.
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When the public purchases certain trademarked goods, it assumes that
all goods bearing that trademark are of equal quality. This is the guaran-
tee function of a trademark. 17 This function does not guarantee high
quality, but rather operates to guarantee equal quality of goods with the
same trademark. "18
A trademark also works as an important element in advertising. 119
While the origin and guarantee functions work for the benefit of the con-
sumers, the advertising function mainly benefits the proprietor of a mark.
Most courts dealing with parallel importation acknowledge both the or-
igin and guarantee functions as purposes of trademark laws. 120 On the
other hand, some courts extend legal protection to the origin function
only. 121 This can be called the single function theory. The guarantee
function is not protected because a trademark owner may legally vary the
quality of goods under the same trademark. 22
As a general rule a single function theory is unsound. The public
chooses certain trademarked goods, believing the marks represent a cer-
tain level of quality. The public should be protected against deception
regarding quality. 123
While the advertising function of trademark rights is important, the ori-
gin and guarantee functions are more important because they protect the
public from deception. Therefore, the problem of parallel importation
should be solved by applying the origin and guarantee functions to the
fact pattern at hand. 124
117. See Hanak, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks. 65 TRADE-MARK REP. 318
(1975) (stressing importance of guarantee function).
118. In the United States, the Lanham Act refers to the control over the quality of trademarked
goods if that trademark is licensed. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970). Legally a trademark owner may sell
goods of different quality under the same trademark. This, however, would confuse the public about
the quality of the trademarked goods and would destroy the goodwill created for the goods.
119. See 3 R. CALLMANN, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES 12
(1969).
120. E.g., Judgment of Nov. 30, 1970, Sup. Ct. (Aus.), reprinted in English in 2 IIC, supra
note 1, at 223; N. MC. Co. v. Schulyro Trading Co., Feb. 27, 1970, Osaka Dist. Ct., 234 Hanrei
Taimuzu (Law Times Reports) 57, reprinted in English in 16 JAIL, supra note 47, at 129.
121. E.g.. Judgment of Jan. 25, 1979, Fed. Sup. Ct. (Switz.). reprinted in English in II IIC
supra note I, at 248-49; Judgment of Feb. 2, 1973, Fed. Sup. Ct. (W. Ger.), reprinted in English in
4 IIC. supra note 1, at 438.
122. However, it is unlikely that a trademark owner would distribute products of varying quality
under the same trademark in the same market. In addition, a national trademark law may obligate the
trademark owner to maintain the same quality for the products, as in the People's Republic of China.
See Offner. Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China: Applicability to Foreign Nations. 13
J. INT. L. & ECON. 601 (1979).
123. On the other hand, Beier, supporting the single function theory, states that the guarantee
function is a mere reflection of the origin function and is a matter for criminal law or unfair competi-
tion law. Beier, Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade, I IIC, supra note 1. at 64.
124. It must be remembered, however, that each nation has different trademark laws, so the
function of trademarks can vary. Compare Offner, supra note 122 (stressing guarantee function in
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2. Competition Considerations
Unlike patent rights, trademark rights do not, in substance, clash with
antitrust philosophy. But if trademark rights are used to divide markets or
for other anticompetitive purposes, their exercise becomes subject to the
antitrust provisions of each nation or community. 125 Thus, a trademark
owner cannot avoid the scrutiny of antitrust law under the guise of the
exercise of domestic trademark rights. In most cases, the motive for par-
allel importation lies in the fact that the trademarked goods are sold in the
domestic market at a higher price than in the foreign market. Parallel im-
porters are, in a sense, striking down the price discrimination or market
division maintained by trademark owners. In this regard, allowing trade-
mark owners to enjoin parallel importation could result in suppression of
competition. Thus, consideration of competitive effects is a prerequisite
to solving the problem of parallel importation. 126
3. Principle of Territoriality
Until the beginning of this century, trademark rights were considered
an extension of the personality of the first user. Consequently, courts de-
ciding parallel importation issues looked to whether the imported goods
had a trademark lawfully affixed in a foreign country. 127 The early deci-
sions allowed parallel importation based on the principle of universality
of trademark rights. 128 As the property aspect of trademark rights grew,
the principle of territoriality of trademark rights, which holds that the le-
gitimacy of trademarks depends on where the goods are sold, prevailed
over the principle of universality. Article 6(3) of the Paris Convention is
said to have affirmed the growth of the territoriality principle. 129
People's Republic of China) with Draft Directive and Regulation of European Economic Community,
reprinted in COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 5826, 5837 (protecting origin function only). The Paris
Convention diminishes some variances, but it does not refer to the functions of a trademark. See
generally S. LADAS, supra note 32, at 965 (discussing Paris Convention).
125. In the United States, these activities constitute misuse of trademarks. See notes 22-28 and
accompanying text supra (discussing antitrust implications of trademark protections in the United
States). Article 36 of the Rome Treaty also bars use of patents to divide markets. See generally S.
LADAS, supra note 32, §§ 740-757 (discussing antitrust implications of trademark laws).
126. This does not mean that direct application of competition laws is necessary. Antitrust con-
siderations are of assistance in determining whether a certain exercise of trademark rights is within
the protection of the trademark law. Beier, Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade,
I IIC, supra note I, at 69.
127. See generally Derenberg, supra note 81 (discussing territoriality principle).
128. For example, the United States court in Apollinaris considered parallel importation as law-
ful so long as the trademark on the imported goods was lawfully affixed in the foreign country.
Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F.18, 19 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
129. Article 6(3) provides: "A mark duly registered in a country of the Union shall be regarded
as independent of marks registered in the other countries of the Union, including the country of
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Some conclude from this territoriality principle that a domestic trade-
mark right is affected only by domestic facts and that whether the trade-
mark was lawfully affixed in a foreign country should not be taken into
account in deciding infringement of domestic trademark rights.130 This
interpretation of the principles of territoriality would prohibit all parallel
importation. But the territoriality of a trademark means only that trade-
mark protection is determined by the national law of the country in which
the owner seeks protection and that the protection is limited to the terri-
tory of that country. 131 Thus, it is not against the principle of territoriality
to consider foreign events in construing a domestic trademark law. There-
fore, the principle of territoriality is of little use in solving the problem of
parallel importation.
4. Exhaustion Theory
Exhaustion theory provides that trademark rights are exhausted once
the trademarked goods have been duly put on the market, so the trade-
mark owner can no longer exercise his trademark right on the marketed
goods. This exhaustion theory has gained acceptance in Germany. 132 The
recent Common Market draft Regulation creating a community trade-
mark1 33 and the Uniform Benelux Trademark Act' 34 also have provisions
on exhaustion of trademark rights.
Some courts have applied the exhaustion theory in favor of parallel
importers. For example, the Austrian court in Agfa expressly applied this
theory to marketing of trademarked goods in a foreign country, and thus
denied the exercise of domestic trademark rights to block parallel impor-
tation. 135
The exhaustion theory does not explain why a trademark right is ex-
hausted upon marketing the trademarked goods. While there is no doubt
that the distribution of trademarked goods in a domestic market exhausts
the trademark right on those goods, the exhaustion theory is silent on
whether a domestic trademark owner's distribution of the trademarked
origin." Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883. 21 U.S.T.
1583. 1639, T.I.A.S. No. 6293.
130. Beier. Territoriality of Tradenzark Law and Internatonal Trade. I IIC, supra note I. at 59.
131. Id. The Austrian court in Agfa. for example, stated that the principle of territoriality is a
conflict principle which derives from international private law and does not preclude domestic courts
from considering foreign circumstances in construing domestic trademark law. Judgment of Nov. 30.
1970. Sup. Ct. (Aus.). reprinted in English in 2 IIC, supra note I. at 223.
132. See notes 69-75 and accompanying text supra (discussing West German case law).
133. COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 5837. at 4731.
134. Benelux Convention on Trade Marks, art. 13A. 704 L.N.T.S. 342. 351-52.
135. Judgment of Nov. 30, 1970, Sup. Ct. (Aus.), reprinted in English in 2 IIC, supra note I. at
223.
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goods in a foreign country exhausts his domestic trademark right. Fur-
thermore, when the trademarked goods are processed or repacked after
distribution, it is generally accepted that the trademark right is not ex-
hausted and that the trademark owner may exercise his right on the pro-
cessed or repacked goods. 136 Therefore, the exhaustion theory grasps the
superficial phenomenon of trademark rights but does not provide a sub-
stantial foundation for that phenomenon. In this sense, the exhaustion
theory by itself cannot solve the problem of parallel importation. 137
B. Solutions to Each Fact Pattern
Thus, the problem of parallel importation is best solved by examining
the functions of trademarks and considering the anticompetitive effects of
barring parallel importation. Applying these principles to/the fact patterns
in which the problem of parallel importation arises reveals how those pat-
terns should be resolved.
In the first general fact pattern, the same entity owns both the domestic
and foreign trademarks. Three patterns of parallel importation are possi-
ble here. First, the owner itself attempts to enjoin importation by a third
party of goods produced and distributed by the owner in another country.
Second, a domestic licensee who only imports trademarked goods at-
tempts to enjoin the importation of goods the owner or a foreign licensee
has produced in a foreign country. Third, a domestic licensee who manu-
factures the trademarked goods locally attempts to enjoin importation of
goods the owner or a foreign licensee has produced elsewhere. In each
case, the imported goods may be of the same or of different quality than
those sold by the domestic producer.
When the imported and domestically produced goods are the same in
quality, the origin and guarantee functions of trademark suggest that par-
allel importation should be allowed. Because quality is the same, the
guarantee function is satisfied. Because the imported and domestically
produced goods derive from the same source, by licensing or otherwise,
the public is not deceived as to the origin of the goods. 138
136. See generally Beier, The Doctrine of Exhaustion in EEC Trademark Law-Scope and Lim-
its, 10 IIC, supra note 1, at 22 (discussing repackaging).
137. The Japanese court in Parker correctly rejected the application of the exhaustion theory
urged by the parallel importer. The court, however, did not explain the rejection. N. MC. Co. v.
Schulyro Trading Co., Feb. 27, 1970, Osaka Dist. Ct., 234 Hanrei Taimuzu (Law Times Reports)
57, reprinted in English in 16 JAIL, supra note 47, at 113.
138. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 115, at 92 (1973). This is the same when the trademarked
goods are also manufactured locally by the domestic licensee. The licensee is linked with and con-
trolled by the trademark owner, and the public, upon parallel importation, would not be concerned
with the actual manufacturer but would be satisfied with the equal quality under the same trademark.
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The problem is more difficult when the imported goods differ in quality
from the domestically produced or marketed goods. Courts and commen-
tators favoring a single function theory are not concerned with the guaran-
tee function, and conclude that the trademark owner cannot prevent paral-
lel importation. 139 A Japanese court, however, enjoined parallel
importation of coffee under the trademark "Nescafe" where the imported
coffee differed in taste from the domestically distributed coffee. 140 Where
there is a substantial difference between the imported and domestic
goods, this result is appropriate because the difference in quality may
deceive consumers. 141 If the difference is indicated on the label of the
imported product, on the other hand, deception will not occur and parallel
importation is appropriate. Parallel importation should also be allowed
when the quality variance is intended to divide markets or allow price
discrimination, rather than to meet variances in local demand. 142
In the second general fact pattern, the domestic and foreign trademarks
are owned by different persons. Here too, examination of the function of
trademarks points out the correct results. If the public will be deceived
about the origin or quality of the trademarked goods, enjoining parallel
importation is appropriate. Where the domestic and foreign trademarks
are owned by entirely different entities, the public may be deceived about
the origin of any imported goods, so enjoining parallel importation is ap-
propriate. 143 Where the domestic trademark owner is associated with the
In fact, the Lanham Act of the United States expressly refers to control by the owner over the quality
of goods in the case of a trademark license. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (1976).
139. E.g., Judgment of Apr. 1, 1969. Commercial Ct. (Neth.), reprinted ii English in I IIC.
supra note 1, at 150; Beier, Territorialin of Trademark Law and International Trade, I IIC. supra
note I .at 66.
140. Nestle Nihon K.K. v. Sankai Shoten (unreported case, Tokyo Dist. Ct., May 29, 1965).
summarized in DIGEST, supra note 44. In the United States, the owner of a trademark may change the
quality of the trademarked goods as long as the change does not amount to deception. Hanak, supra
note 117, at 330.
141. One may argue that a composite trademark such as "New Nescafe" should be adopted to
keep the value of the original trademark alive. But it would be a harsh obligation to change the
trademark every time the composition of the trademarked goods is slightly changed. Furthermore.
some trademarks might lose their value if another word is added to them.
142. The Court of Justice of European Community in American Home held that the adoption of
different trademarks on the same product in each country may constitute a "disguised restriction" on
trade for the purpose of artificially partitioning the market. Centrafarm B.V. v. American Home
Products Corp., 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1823, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9 8475, at 8593.
143. The European Court of Justice in Terrapin/Terranova dealt with this situation. This fact
pattern, however, may even be outside the problem of parallel importation. The European Court of
Justice in Sirena and Hag presented a new fact pattern of parallel importation in which the domestic
and the foreign trademarks have a common origin but both owners have no present relation, legally or
economically. In this fact pattern also, parallel importation would probably mislead the public as to
the origin of imported goods. Moreover, it is probable that the goods of the domestic trademark
owner differ in quality from those of the foreign trademark owner. In this sense, the public may also
be deceived as to the quality.
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foreign owner, as in a distributorship agreement, or through a legal rela-
tion such as parent-subsidiary, parallel importation should be allowed, as
the public is not deceived about the origin of the goods. 144 However, even
where the domestic and foreign trademark owners are closely related,
parallel importation may be enjoined if the difference in quality is not
clearly indicated on the imported goods or if the purpose of the quality
variance is market division or price discrimination.
III. CONCLUSION
The problem of parallel importation has been solved through case law
in most countries. Despite the slightly different views among various
countries, this comparative case study suggests that the functions of a
trademark are the appropriate criteria to settle this problem. The basic
functions of a trademark are to designate the origin of the goods and to
guarantee the quality of the goods. As long as the public is not deceived
or misled about the origin or quality of the trademarked goods, a domestic
trademark owner or licensee generally cannot enjoin parallel importation
by a third party. A trademark right can be exercised only to prevent cer-
tain types of unfair competition which would cause confusion or decep-
tion about origin or quality.
144. Where domestic and foreign trademark owners have a parent-subsidiary relation or belong
to the same group of enterprises, the public generally recognizes that the goods come from the parent-
subsidiary as a whole or from the group en bloc. Beier, Territoriality of Trademark Law and Interna-
tional Trade, 1 IIC, supra note 1, at 71.
Where the domestic trademark owner is a distributor, the trademarked goods of both the distributor
and the parallel importer come from the single source of a foreign manufacturer. So there is no
deception as to the origin of trademarked goods. Furthermore, the public generally attaches no impor-
tance to the identity of a distributor. The United States Supreme Court in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel
found that the public understood that the goods came from the domestic distributor. 260 U.S. 689,
692 (1923). If the trademark comes to symbolize the distributor and if the consumers purchase the
trademarked goods solely in reliance on the disbributor, sales of the trademarked goods by the paral-
lel importer may deceive such consumers. However, such a situation is almost inconceivable unless
the distributor picks up its own trademark for the goods.
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